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Abstract: Spatial models of voting behaviour are the dominant paradigm in political 
science. Consistent with this approach, it will be the case that, ceteris paribus, voters 
should vote for the party nearest to them on the political spectrum. A key question is 
how we measure nearness or distance. We investigate this issue by estimating discrete 
choice models for voting outcomes using the 2001 Australian Election Study survey 
data. The evidence supports the proposition that it is perceived and not actual distance 
that performs best. Our findings also suggest that where a voter locates on the political 
spectrum is almost as good a predictor of their voting outcome as how close they are 
to the parties.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Hotelling (1929) established the basic idea of spatial competition. This concept has 
become particularly important in the Public Choice and Political Science literature, 
where it is known as the proximity model. Consider two soft drink vendors on a mile 
long beach.
1 A social planner, wishing to minimise consumer transport costs, would 
place each vendors at ¼ and ¾ mile positions. In a competitive market, however, each 
of the vendors would locate themselves back to back in the centre of the beach (1/2 
mile) and attempt to “poach” consumers from the other vendor. Hotelling makes the 
argument at the end of his paper that his model could very easily explain political 
behaviour. In Hotelling’s view individual voters will donate money and vote for the 
party closest to them on the “political beach.”
2 
 
Thurner (2000) describes the proximity model as the “dominant paradigm in 
mathematical political theory.” Mueller (2003) indicates this model is based on a 
series of “unrealistic assumptions” (p. 232); however, the predictive power of the 
model (and its extensions) “seems sufficiently strong” (p. 666). Lewis and King 
(1999) state that “countless papers” simply assume the proximity model is true while 
testing other hypotheses. This paper is concerned with the empirical applications of 
the model. We are not particularly interested in testing the theory itself rather we are 
interested in how “distance” is measured. In some respects our paper is similar to 
Lewis and King (1999) that compares the directional and proximity models. Their 
results suggest that the measure of party location can have “important side effects for 
estimation” (p. 27). 
 
In this paper we estimate a number of models that use different measures of location 
and of distance and compare their accuracy. The models considered include two 
models that test the directional spatial model described by Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald (1989). Our results indicate that when d istance is measured as the 
difference between voter location and mean party location that the directional and 
                                                 
1 Textbook treatments of the Hotelling location theorem use beaches. Hotelling (1929) himself did not 
use beaches but rather “Main Street.” 
2 Hotelling (1929: 55) writes, “The Democratic party, once opposed to protective tariffs, moves 
gradually to a position almost, but not quite identical with that of the Republicans. It need have no fear 
of fanatical free traders since they will still prefer it to the Republican party, and its advocacy of a 
continued high tariff will bring it money and votes of some intermediate groups.”   2
proximity models are empirically equivalent. When distance is measured as the 
difference between voter location and voter placement of the party that the proximity 
model empirically dominates the directional model and the absolute measure 
dominates the quadratic measure. 
 
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the 
measures of distance. Section 3 describes the data that we use in our analysis. We then 
discuss the models (section 4) and the results of our analysis (section 5). Finally, 
section 6 provides some conclusions. 
 
2.  Measures of Distance 
 
Political parties compete in “ideological space” and voting outcomes could be 
influenced either by an individual’s own position in “ideological space” or by the 
distance between the individual voter and the party in such “ideological space”. 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) introduce the idea of “directional spatial voting”. 
The notion is that individuals who define themselves as being on the left will only 
vote for parties that they perceive to be on the left, i.e. the voter will not vote for the 
nearest party if they perceive that party to be “right” rather they may vote for a party 
further away from themselves as long as that party is “left.” In this case it is the 
individual’s own position in “ideological space” that will ceteris paribus influence the 
voting outcome. 
 
We now consider the situation where voting outcomes are influenced by the distance 
between the individual voter and the party in such “ideological space”. For simplicity 
we consider a political beach with two political parties L and R. Each party locates at 
position  L z  and  R z . We have voters who are located across the beach. The median 
voter theorem says that any voter i will vote for the party (L, R) closest to her own 
position on the beach ( i z ).  There are two possibilities concerning the voting rule that 
might be used. 
 
According to Hinich and Munger (1997) the voting rule is written in terms of squared 
distances as follows:   3
E[(zi – zR)
2] < E[(zi – zL)
2] ￿ Vote R     (1a) 
E[(zi – zR)
2] > E[(zi – zL)
2] ￿ Vote L     (1b) 
Drazen (2000), on the other hand, formulates the decision rule in terms of absolute 
distances as follows: 
E[|zi – zR|] < E[|zi – zL|] ￿ Vote R       (2a) 
E[|zi – zR|] > E[|zi – zL|] ￿ Vote L       (2b) 
We view the question of whether the decision rule is written in terms of squared or 
absolute distances as an empirical one that we consider in our analysis. 
 
The next issue is to define  L z  and  R z . Here the issue of voter uncertainty arises. 
Candidates
3 for elections make promises regarding their behaviour and choices once 
elected. Belief or disbelief of those promises is a simple issue, however, voters may 
be uncertain as to believe or disbelieve election promises. Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998) provide a set of theories that show how, when and why voters may choose to 
believe or not believe candidate promises. The problem for voters is that the exact 
position of any given party is not known with certainty. To the extent that parties 
locate near each other, but not exactly next to each other, voters may have difficulty 
deciding who the nearest party is. A further problem facing empirical research is that 
we also do not know where the party is located with any certainty. 
 
Empirical research usually uses some form of survey to rate respondents on a Left-
Right scale and then also candidates (or their policy positions) on the same Left-Right 
scale. As an empirical issue, Alvarez (1997) uses, and recommends, the sample mean 
of candidate placements as a measure of the “true” position of the parties. He argues 
that this approach is widely employed, is simple and the data readily available. Hinich 
and Munger (1997) show that the sample mean is appropriate if we assume voters 
have rational expectations. In this case for any given party  p its’ position is 
represented as  p p p z z e + =  where  p e  is a random error term with mean zero. In this 
paper in the situation that the position of the party is taken as the sample mean we 
define “measured distance” as the difference between the voters’ own position and the 
                                                 
3 We use the terms candidate and party interchangeably in this paper.   4
sample mean position of the party. Measured distance could itself be defined using 
either squared or absolute distance. 
 
It seems unusual to ask survey respondents where they place themselves on the 
political beach (a subjective assessment), to compare that to an objective (assuming 
rational expectations) candidate position and then “forecast” who that respondent 
would vote for. This approach also abstracts from the voter uncertainty as to where a 
candidate locates. To account for this uncertainty would require it to be explicitly 
modelled. Furthermore, while it does overcome some statistical issues related to 
missing observations (Alvarez (1997)), it does use up degrees of freedom in 
calculating the mean and may induce an error in variables problem. Powell (1989) has 
shown that error can occur due to respondents guessing where parties are also from 
instrument-induced error. Further Lewis and King (1999) indicate that even if the 
party location could be measured without any error, parties h ave incentives to 
emphasise different policies to different voters and/or groups of voters.   
 
In short, this approach requires candidates to expend some resources establishing their 
position on the beach and/or voters need to expend resources discovering  where 
parties are on the beach. As Hotelling (1929) makes clear, parties prefer not to be too 
specific about their exact location. Similarly the literature indicates that individual 
voters do not expend too many resources when making political decisions (see Lupia 
and McCubbins (1998)). It is for these reasons that we argue that this approach is 
inconsistent with the underlying theory and our knowledge of voter behaviour. An 
alternate approach would be to compare the voters’ subjective assessment of their 
own location on the beach and then to compare it to their own subjective assessment 
of where they place the parties on the beach. The smaller that distance the more likely, 
ceteris paribus, they are to vote for that party.  Thus in our analysis we define 
“perceived distance” as the difference between the voters’ own position and the voters 
perception of the position of the party. Perceived distance could itself be defined 
using either squared or absolute distance. 
 
This section has shown the that either an individuals’ own location on the beach or 
their measured distance from the parties or their perceived distance from the parties 
can,  ceteris paribus, influence voting outcome. Moreover, both of the distance   5
measures can be defined either in terms of a squared or absolute value metric. These 
measures are compared in section 5. 
 
3.  Data 
 
We employ data from the 2001 Australian Federal Election. At that election the entire 
House of Representatives and half the Senate were elected. Government is formed by 
the party (or parties) that command a majority in the House of Representatives. In 
some respects Australia is well suited to investigate the proximity model and 
appropriate measures of distance. First, voting is compulsory and issues such as 
alienation and voter turnout are unlikely to bias results. Second we have data to 
calculate location for both incumbents and also for (most) challengers. At a minimum 
we can calculate location for all major political parties that contested the House of 
Representatives. We cannot calculate location for individual challengers (incumbents) 
in some seats and for extreme fringe parties such as the Shooters Party and the No-
Airport Noise Party.
4 Factors, which may reduce the desirability of Australian data, 
include the preferential  voting system and a coalition government. These factors are 
known to undermine the proximity model.  
 
We believe, however, that these two factors are less likely to introduce bias to the 
results. First the outcome of the election was not determined by preference votes and 
second the coalition government (Liberals and National parties) is an  ex ante 
coalition. The parties “have been in permanent coalition since 1923” (McAllister 
2003) and voters know in advance that should they win the majority of seats that these 
two parties will form government. 
 
Our analysis of the 2001 election is based on the Australian Electoral Study (AES) 
(Bean et al 2002).
5 The AES is conducted after every federal election and surveying 
for the 2001 election occurred between 12 November 2001 and 5 April 2002. The 
sample is drawn from the electoral roll which, given Australia’s mandatory voting 
                                                 
4 These latter parties won very few votes and their appeal is extremely limited. On the other hand some 
individuals, not affiliated with any party did win some seats. 
5 A full description can be found at http://assda.anu.edu.au/codebooks/aes2001/title.html   6
regime, is kept up to date and is reliable. In total there are 2010 cases (individual 
voters) and 379 variables per case in the final data set.  
 
Importantly for our purposes the AES asks voters to rank themselves on a “Left-
Right” spectrum and also to rank the various political parties on the same “Left-
Right” spectrum. The ranking ranges from 0 (very left) to 10 (very right). Most voters 
(41.8%) rank themselves as being in the centre (5 on the scale). Table 1 summarises 
the “Left-Right” spectrum results. 
 
Table 1: Left-Right Spectrum. 
  Left-Right Score 
  Mean  Median  Std.Dev 
Own  5.30  5  1.98 
Liberal  6.49  7  2.59 
National  6.31  7  2.56 
Coalition  6.40  7  2.38 
Labor  4.71  5  2.36 
Democrat  4.39  5  2.00 
One Nation  5.90  6  3.76 
Greens  3.65  4  2.40 
 
Results are a ranking of the voter perception of self and the various political parties on 
a “Left-Right” spectrum. We see that the Greens are seen as the left-most party in 
Australia. Interestingly, the One Nation Party – popularly thought to be on the right is 
seen by voters to be to the “left” of each of the coalition partners (Liberals and 
Nationals). This result is due to the bimodal distribution of the data for that party. It is 
probable that this bimodality is a result of the fact that the One Nation Party has a 
combination of policies that could be described as being “left” from an economic 
perspective or “right” from a social perspective.    7
 
4.  Modelling Voting Outcomes 
4.1  Discrete Choice Modelling 
We now consider the individual voter’s decision of which party to vote for. The AES 
asked respondents which party they voted for in the House of Representatives in the 
2001 Federal Election. In our modelling we estimate a discrete choice model for the 
probability that voter i votes for party j. Underlying this decision is a random utility 
model: 
. , , 1 ; , , 1 , J j   n i       V U ij ij ij K K = = + = e  
This model postulates that voter i derives “utilities” ( ij U ) from voting for each of the 
J parties. These utilities are decomposed into two components: a deterministic 
component ( ij V ) and a stochastic component ( ij e ). The voter is assumed to vote for 
the party that yields them maximum utility. The functional form for the probability 
that voter  i votes for party  j is determined by the choice of distribution for the 
stochastic component ij e .  ij V  is taken to be a linear-in-parameters function of the 
characteristics of the parties (in our case the distance that party j is from voter i) and 
the characteristics of the voter (e.g. income) with outcome specific coefficients 
( j i ij ij x d V b a
' + = ).  
 
The random utility maximization model is made operational by the choice of the 
distribution for the stochastic component. We begin by assuming that the  ij e  in the 
random utility model are independent, identically distributed Extreme Value. This 











j party    for   votes   i    voter  
To complete the specification an identifying restriction is required such that one of the 
coefficient vectors ( j b ) is normalised to zero
6. The model is estimated by maximum 
likelihood. 
                                                 
6 In our case the normalisation is to set the coefficient vector for Coalition to zero.   8
 
4.2  Determinants of Voting Behaviour 
 
The focus of this paper is the investigation of the different specifications of 
“distance”. To this end we fit a number of MNL models for individual voter choice 
between Coalition, ALP, Democrats, Greens, One Nation and Others. In total six 
models are estimated, each one having a different specification of “distance”. 
However, to ensure that our results are comparable across the models we employ a 
common set of “control” variables in each of the models
7. We now describe these 
control variables. 
 
Alvarez, Nagler and Willette (2000) argue that there is an “incumbent bias”. That is, 
when it is felt that the financial situation of the household and/or the general 
economic situation in the country has improved in the recent past or will improve in 
the future then the government is more likely to retain the support of the household. 
Only if the “economy” (household and/or country) is performing badly does support 
for opposition parties improve. Thus the way that we control for economic 
performance has been captured is through the “hip pocket” questions on the 
household and national performance compared to 12 months ago.  
 
A number of economic issues, however, can play a role in their own right. It is often 
felt that unemployment, industrial relations, taxation, education and health policies 
and performance can play a role in determining electoral outcomes. Indeed, many 
parties campaign actively on such issues. Parties also focus upon other policy issues 
such as the environment, immigration, national security and, more recently, terrorism. 
To control for these issue based factors we use indicator variables for the importance 
that an individual places on: Health & Education, Tax & GST, Defence & Terrorism 
and Immigration & Refugees. 
 
Whilst economic and other issues undoubtedly contribute to electoral outcomes, 
personal characteristics of the voters themselves also play a role. “Conservative” 
parties tend to be supported by older voters; “educated” voters might favour “Green” 
                                                 
7 In the notation above these control variables are elements of the  i x  vector.   9
parties and so on. Thus we also use a number of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the voter (gender, age, income, educational attainment and marital 
status) as controls that influence voting outcomes. The final control variable is the 
type of electoral  division that the voter resides in (Inner Metropolitan, Outer 
Metropolitan, Provincial or Rural). 
 
Controlling for the factors discussed above we hypothesise that voting outcomes 
could be influenced either by an individual’s own position in “ideological space” or 
by the distance between the individual voter and the party in such “ideological space”. 
An individuals’ positioning of themselves in Left-Right space will be denoted  i z . 
Such a variable is a characteristic of the individual and forms part of the  i x  
component of the (expected) utility function  ij V . In our modelling we allow for two 
possibilities. That the coefficients associated with  i z  vary freely across voting 
outcomes (parties) or that the coefficients associated with  i z  are equal across voting 
outcomes (parties). 
 
The discussion in section 2 above suggested that there were two possible ways of 
defining distance (Measured and perceived distance) and that each of these could be 
measured using squared or absolute value metrics. If the distance that voter i is from 
party j is defined by  ij d , an individuals’ positioning of themselves in Left-Right space 
by  i z , the individuals’ placement of party j by  ij z  and the mean (over all respondents) 
placement of party  j as  j z  we define measured distance by  j i ij z z d - =  or 
( )
2
j i ij z z d - = . Perceived distance is defined by  ij i ij z z d - =  or  ( )
2
ij i ij z z d - = . 
Plots of measured distance, absolute value and perceived distance, absolute value can 
be found in Figures 1 and 2
8. 
 
FIGURES 1 and 2 about here 
 
                                                 
8 In Figure 2 the points plotted are the mean perceived distance for the sub-sample of individuals at that 
point in the political spectrum.   10
Both measures clearly show that on the left of the beach voters are closer to the 
Australian Greens and on the right of the beach to the Coalition. It is also the case that 
the gaps between the parties are wider for the perceived distance measure. 
 
Thus in our empirical analysis we estimate six models. Each of these models has a 
different variable to reflect either position or distance. Table 2 summarises the 
models: 
Table 2: Models and Measures 
Model  Measure 
M1  Own LR position [coefficients unrestricted] 
M2  Own LR position [coefficients equal across outcomes] 
M3  Measured distance, absolute value 
M4  Measured distance, squared value 
M5  Perceived distance, absolute value 
M6  Perceived distance, squared value 
 
We now turn to a discussion of the results of estimating the six models. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1   Comparing the Models 
All six models were estimated by maximum likelihood methods. As our emphasis is 
on comparing the empirical performance of the six competing measures we do not 
present the coefficient estimates rather we focus on which model (measure) performs 
best
9. We note, however, that the parameter estimates on the control factors are robust 
across the six models. 
 
We use a number of criteria to select the “best” model. The models are not nested, 
consequently we cannot formally test which is the best model. Instead we make use of 
two model selection criteria  – the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 
(1973)) and the Schwarz or Bayesian Criterion (SC) (Schwarz (1978)). These criteria 
are based upon the value of the maximized log-likelihood function adjusted for the 
estimation sample size and penalized for the number of parameters fitted. For both 
criteria the preferred model is the one that has the lowest vale of the criterion. Table 3 
                                                 
9 Full estimation results are available on request from the authors.   11
gives the values of AIC and SC. From this table we see that Model  5: Perceived 
distance, absolute value is the “best” model. 
 
Table 3: Model Selection Criteria Values. 
Model  Sample  Parameters  lnL  AIC  SC 
M1  Own Left-Right: MNL  1246  80  -1217.91  2515.81  3006.03 
M2  Own Left-Right: Constrained MNL  1246  76  -1226.55  2529.11  2994.81 
M3  Measured Distance: Absolute Value  1246  76  -1226.45  2528.91  2994.61 
M4  Measured Distance: Squared Value  1246  76  -1219.18  2514.35  2980.06 
M5  Perceived Distance: Absolute Value  1013  76  -901.49  1878.97  2328.94 
M6  Perceived Distance: Squared Value  1013  76  -916.51  1909.01  2358.99 
 
We also compare the models on their ability to correctly classify the observed voting 
outcomes. Table 4 tells us how accurate the six models are in classifying each of the 
voting outcomes and their overall accuracy. Again we see that Model 5: Perceived 
distance, absolute value is the “best” model. 
 
Table 4: Percentage Correct from Classification Hit-Miss Tables. 
  M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6 
Coalition  79.66  79.66  79.66  79.66  85.02  84.39 
A.L.P.  67.18  66.74  66.96  66.96  72.14  71.87 
Democrat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  10.61  4.55 
Greens  16.42  13.43  22.39  22.39  28.33  23.33 
O.N.P.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  6.67  3.33 
Other  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total  62.60  62.28  62.84  62.84  67.92  66.73 
 
5.2  Some scenarios 
Our comparison of the models and measures has clearly indicated that Model 5 that 
uses perceived distance, absolute value is the “best” model. In this section we report 
the results of two particular scenarios to illustrate how the probabilities of voting for 
each of the parties vary as we move across the Australian political beach from left to 
right. In the first scenario we step through the Left-Right spectrum holding all the 
controls at their sample means and using the mean values of distance (perceived 
distance, absolute vale) at each point in the spectrum. The results of this are found in 
Figure 3. For the second scenario we step through the Left-Right spectrum setting all 
the controls and distance (perceived distance, absolute vale) to their sample means at 
each point in the spectrum.   12
 
Figures 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Both figures tell a similar story that the probability of voting for the Coalition (Labor) 
increases (decreases) as we move from left to right. On the left, at the value of 2 on 
the scale there is a fall in the probability of voting Labor due to an increase in the 
probability of voting Green. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Spatial models of voting behaviour are the dominant paradigm in political science. 
Consistent with this approach, it will be the case that, ceteris paribus, voters should 
vote for the party nearest to them on the political spectrum. A key question is how we 
measure nearness or distance. We investigate this issue using the 2001 Australian 
Election Study survey data. W e estimate a number of models that use different 
measures of location and of distance and compare their accuracy. The models 
considered include two models that test the directional spatial model. Our results 
indicate that when distance is measured as the difference between voter location and 
mean party location that the directional and proximity models are empirically 
equivalent. When distance is measured as the difference between voter location and 
voter placement of the party that the proximity model empirically dominates the 
directional model and the absolute measure dominates the quadratic measure. 
   13
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